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Abstract
The programs within NASA's Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) conduct research and 
development to improve the national air transportation system so that Americans can travel as safely as possible. 
NASA aviation safety systems analysis personnel support various levels of ARMD management in their fulfillment 
of system analysis and technology prioritization as defined in the agency’s program and project requirements.  This 
paper provides a framework for the assessment of aviation safety research and technology portfolios that includes 
metrics such as projected impact on current and future safety, technical development risk and implementation risk.  
The paper also contains methods for presenting portfolio analysis and aviation safety Bayesian Belief Network 
(BBN) output results to management using bubble charts and quantitative decision analysis techniques.  
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Introduction 
The programs within the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) Aeronautics Research Mission 
Directorate (ARMD) conduct research and development to improve the national air transportation system so that 
Americans can travel as safely as possible. NASA aviation safety systems analysis personnel support various levels 
of ARMD management in their fulfillment of system analyses and technology prioritizations as defined in the 
agency’s Research and Technology Program and Project Management Requirements (National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration, 2013).  Traditionally, multidisciplinary optimization techniques have been used in aerospace 
systems analyses (Alexandrov, Kaplan, Oran & Boris, 2010; Tong, Jones, Arcara & Haller, 2005), but overly 
complex methods can sometimes have pitfalls:  
The proponents of many R&D project-selection methods have not appeared too concerned about 
the level of complexity of their particular technique. Some approaches presented in the literature 
are so mathematically elaborate that they necessitate the assistance of an expert decision analyst 
in order to be usable by most real-world managers. As a consequence, very little use has been 
made by managers of many of these approaches (Henriksen & Traylor, 1999)
Many organizations external to the NASA ARMD are also developing frameworks and methods for evaluating the 
impact of National Airspace System (NAS) enhancements. Examples include the Joint Implementation 
Measurement and Data Analysis Team’s (JIMDAT) process for evaluating proposed Commercial Aviation Safety 
Team (CAST) system enhancements (CAST, 2004), the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) development of 
models to determine the safety risks in the Next Generation Air Transportation System (Goldner & Borener, 2006) 
and the National Aerospace Laboratory (NLR) of the Netherlands’ aviation system modeling activities (Roelen & 
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Exhibit 3.  Technical Development Risk Criteria 
Implementation Risk
The Implementation Risk (IR) assessment is an examination of the possible impediments to actual implementation 
of proposed technologies in the NAS. One of NASA’s strategic objectives is advance aeronautics research to 
“enable a revolutionary transformation” of air travel “for safe and sustainable U.S. and global aviation” (NASA, 
2014). The importance of the IR metric in aviation safety portfolio assessment is that it helps project managers 
identify implementation risk drivers such as market penetration and dependencies (e.g., new training and/or 
infrastructure requirements).   
The IR criteria are based on various assessment techniques used by the FAA and industry (Jones & 
Reveley, 2003). The criteria, shown in Exhibit 4, were applied to the project research portfolio using the same 
process described for the TDR assessment in the previous section.  
Exhibit 4.  Implementation Risk Criteria 
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Portfolio Analysis Results Presentation Methods 
A number of methods have been used by the aviation safety systems analysis personnel to display the portfolio 
assessment results that can be generated using the metrics defined in the previous section. In this section of the 
paper, some of the methods most frequently used by the NASA ARMD for aviation safety technology portfolio 
assessments are described.  
Summary Tables
Simple summary tables of metric results have been used by NASA ARMD for several safety systems analysis 
studies. In Exhibit 6, technologies that were identified as having a potential impact on a Safety Tall Pole are 
indicated by 9 in the table.
Exhibit 6.  Sample Current Part 135 Safety Tall Poles Results Using Checkmark Ratings. 
Exhibit 7 also uses the Safety Tall Poles metrics, but technologies were rated using values of direct, indirect or no 
impact.  The Technical Development Risk and Implementation Risk metrics are evaluated using high, medium and 
low ratings. A table containing sample TDR results is shown in Exhibit 8.   
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Exhibit 7.  Sample Current Part 121 Tall Poles Results Using Direct/Indirect Ratings 
Exhibit 8.  Sample Technical Development Risk Results 
Bubble Charts
Bubble charts have been used in R&D portfolio analysis (Roussel, Saad, & Erickson, 1991; MacMillan & McGrath, 
2002) to visually examine three or more metrics at one time.  In the assessment framework used by the NASA 
aviation safety systems analysis team, each bubble in the chart represents a technology. The size of the bubble 
represents the total safety tall poles tally (i.e., total number of current and safety tall poles impacted by the product). 
The color of the bubble can be changed to help display pertinent information decision makers. For example, in 
Exhibit 9, all of the products in a project’s technology portfolio are color coded based on their total impact on the 
current and future safety tall poles (green = greatest impact; red = least impact). A quick glimpse of the chart reveals 
that the two technologies color coded green (C-2 and C-4) are expected to have the greatest safety impact. Another 
display method used is to color code the bubbles based on the Project Subprojects as shown in Exhibit 10. All of the 
technologies in Subprojects A and B have mostly low implementation risks, but the technologies in Subproject C 
have a wide range of implementation risk. 
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according to their perceived value to their research goals. The weights assigned to each metric should be obtained 
from decision makers prior to implementation of any decision analysis method so that analysis results are not 
manipulated to obtain a desired outcome.  
Exhibit 11. Sample Portfolio Prioritization Using Weighted Sum Model (All Metrics Equal)
.
Conclusion
The framework (metrics and presentation methods) presented in this paper has been developed as a result of over ten 
years of implementing analyses of aviation safety technology portfolios. The advantages of this framework include: 
(1) it is not mathematically elaborate and therefore usable by real-world managers, (2) it does not rely solely on fatal 
accident rate for measuring safety and (3) it includes multiple ways to measure non-quantifiable safety benefits. 
Future work will continue in the development of additional models for implementation of the Projected Impact on 
Aviation Safety Risk Scenarios metric.  Other metrics pertaining to costs/safety benefits are also expected to be 
included in future version of this framework.  
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